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Abstract
Background: With increasing demand for red meat in Tanzania comes heightened potential for zoonotic infections
in animals and humans that disproportionately affect poor communities. A range of frontline government employees
work to protect public health, providing services for people engaged in animal-based livelihoods (livestock owners and
butchers), and enforcing meat safety and food premises standards. In contrast to literature which emphasises the
inadequacy of extension support and food safety policy implementation in low- and middle-income countries, this
paper foregrounds the ‘street-level diplomacy’ deployed by frontline actors operating in challenging contexts.
Methods: This research is based on semi-structured interviews with 61 government employees, including livestock
extension officers/meat inspectors and health officers, across 10 randomly-selected rural and urban wards.
Results: Frontline actors combined formal and informal strategies including the leveraging of formal policy texts and
relationships with other state employees, remaining flexible and recognising that poverty constrained people’s ability
to comply with health regulations. They emphasised the need to work with livestock keepers and butchers to build
their knowledge to self-regulate and to work collaboratively to ensure meat safety. Remaining adaptive and being
hesitant to act punitively unless absolutely necessary cultivated trust and positive relations, making those engaged in
animal-based livelihoods more open to learning from and cooperating with extension officers and inspectors. This may
result in higher levels of meat safety than might be the case if frontline actors stringently enforced regulations.
Conclusion: The current tendency to view frontline actors’ partial enforcement of meat safety regulations as a failure
obscures the creative and proactive ways in which they seek to ensure meat safety in a context of limited resources.
Their application of ‘street-level diplomacy’ enables them to be sensitive to local socio-economic realities, to respect
local social norms and expectations and to build support for health safety interventions when necessary. More
explicitly acknowledging the role of trust and positive state-society relations and the diplomatic skills deployed by
frontline actors as a formal part of their inspection duties offers new perspectives and enhanced understandings on
the complicated nature of their work and what might be done to support them.
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Background
The growing scale and quickening pace of economic,
political, social and ecological change around the world
has increased the risk of zoonotic pathogen emergence
and re-emergence, and of associated outbreaks of disease
in animals and humans [1, 2]. Interrelated processes of
globalisation, population growth, urbanisation, climate
change, conflict, shifting land use and disruption of trad-
itional socio-environmental systems, changing diets and
livelihoods are bringing people, animals and microbes
into novel interactions creating new, complex and dy-
namic channels of disease risk, especially in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) [3–6].
Tanzania – in addition to undergoing many of the afore-
mentioned processes – hosts Africa’s third largest concen-
tration of livestock and, with its abundant biodiversity, is
vulnerable to emerging, re-emerging and endemic zoo-
noses [7–9]. Outbreak events such as the 2006/2007 Rift
Valley Fever (RVF) epidemic have wrought substantial
economic, social and psychological damage, tending to
primarily affect marginalised populations including poor
urban and peri-urban dwellers, and rural, pastoral and
agro-pastoral people [10, 11]. While outbreaks of some
zoonoses, such as RVF, Ebola, anthrax, Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS), and avian and swine influenza garner
attention and concern, a number of endemic zoonoses –
such as brucellosis, leptospirosis, Q fever and non-
typhoidal Salmonella - attract far less consideration and
yet have important if less newsworthy, negative conse-
quences for individual, community and national develop-
ment in Tanzania and across the global south [12–15].
One potential way humans can become infected with
zoonotic pathogens is through animal product consump-
tion, including red meat [16, 17]. Rural, poor and pre-
dominantly small-scale farmers undertake the majority
of Tanzania’s livestock production [18]. Here, growing
urban populations and rising incomes have increased
meat demand [19]. Beef is favoured, and, in 2017,
accounted for 82% of meat production [20]. Overall,
Tanzanians prefer fresh produce – including freshly
butchered ‘warm’ red meat – which they perceive to be
locally or domestically sourced and the vast majority of
people purchase meat in small, local butcheries on days
they intend to cook and consume it [19, 21, 22].
Meat value chain actors in Tanzania include livestock
farmers, handlers, traders, transporters, processors,
owners of slaughter sites, butcheries, eateries and associ-
ated workers. They are subject to regulations governing
how animals are cared for, transported, slaughtered,
processed, stored and sold, which include procedural,
infrastructural and personnel standards. Considerable
national-level legislation exists to inform management of
animal health, slaughter and meat sale including the
Animal Disease Act (2003); Tanzania Food, Drugs and
Cosmetics Act (2003); Public Health Act (2009); Stan-
dards Act (2009); Meat Industry Act (2006); Veterinary
Act (2003) and others. National oversight of food safety
lies with multiple state bodies including the Tanzania
Food and Drugs Authority, the Ministry of Livestock
and Fisheries, and the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards
[19] which are responsible for technical regulations. Ul-
timate responsibility for monitoring, inspection and ani-
mal health service delivery however, is decentralised and
is the remit of Local Government Authorities at district,
ward and village level [23, 24]. So long as local provision
remains within the bounds set by national law and regu-
lations, standards may vary as local decision-making and
bylaws drawn up by LGAs manage issues in locally ap-
propriate and acceptable ways.
While a range of Tanzanian government actors are re-
sponsible for ensuring meat is safe for human consump-
tion, monitoring regulatory compliance, and ensuring
disease events in animals and humans are prevented or
quickly stopped, those most central to this at ward and vil-
lage level are public Health Officers (HOs) and Livestock
Extension Officers (LEOs), many of whom also work as
meat inspectors [25].1 LEOs’ and HOs’ responsibilities, in
relation to the prevention and mitigation of zoonotic dis-
ease in animals and related meat-borne illness, fall into
three overlapping activities, namely: preventative mea-
sures and animal-based livelihood support; the manage-
ment of disease incidents and outbreaks; and meat site
(slaughter sites, butcheries, other meat retailers) inspec-
tion, monitoring, and related sanction.
In many countries, the implementation of government
policy and regulation, and extension officers’ work has
been recognised as challenging and often inadequate [21,
25, 26]. Theoretical policy implementation literature
shows, in keeping with this, that this is seldom unprob-
lematic, with frequent ‘implementation failures’ [27, 28].
In seeking to understand these failures, attention has fo-
cused on how administrative directives and processes
interact with contextual, socio-economic, cultural and pol-
itical aspects to shape implementation. Bringing the top-
down, ‘highly scripted’ dimension of policy implementa-
tion together with its bottom-up, informal dimensions has
introduced new emphasis on governance arrangements,
policy networks, and institutional relationships [27]. The
space between these top-down and bottom-up dimensions
is occupied by frontline actors, or ‘street-level bureaucrats’
[29], who have degrees of ‘decisional latitude’ to deter-
mine which policy directives they respond to and how
they satisfy government objectives while accommodating
local, contextual factors, and retaining professional auton-
omy [27, 30, 31]. These frontline actors bring their own
values, knowledge, and norms to bear as they enter into
processes of ‘negotiation and bargaining’ with people who
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form the policy target [32]. Despite widespread recogni-
tion of frontline actors’ discretionary roles in mediating
‘technically complex policy matters’, the ways in which
they undertake policy implementation remain ‘opaque’
[31], especially in LMICs.
While much research has focused on how frontline ac-
tors’ discretion might result in policies being operationa-
lised in ways that contradict or undermine policy makers’
intentions [29, 30], far less attention has been paid to the
skills required to implement policy, particularly in con-
texts of limited resources. The emphasis has been on
frontline actors’ ability to subvert and reorient policy
through implementation, rather than exploring how their
flexibility and discretionary powers can be used to imple-
ment policy, or approximate policy goals even if through
unprescribed or unorthodox strategies. This paper ex-
plores the day-to-day strategies employed by frontline ac-
tors such as LEOs and HOs to do their work in relation to
meat safety in northern Tanzania. Taking an actor-
oriented approach [33], it distinguishes itself from the
bulk of literature on the meat value chain and food and
meat safety policy implementation in LMICs which em-
phasises deficiencies and inadequacies of the food safety
system and associated technical staff [24, 34, 35]. Instead,
drawing on policy implementation literature and the con-
cept of ‘street-level diplomacy’ which emphasises relation-
ships, interpersonal trust and the use of negotiation to
enhance policy compliance [28, 36, 37], this paper fore-
grounds the experiences, perceptions, knowledge and ‘soft’
skills of staff to understand how they do their jobs and
why they choose to operate in particular ways. Through
this, it explores how creative day-to-day enactment of
health and safety can, and needs to be, recognised in
contexts where policy may be regarded as appropriate, yet
resources for implementation remain scarce and demon-
strates the importance of social inquiry to understanding
and tackling disease in LMICs [38].
Methods
This paper is based on 61 semi-structured interviews con-
ducted with regional (Kilimanjaro) (n = 2), district (Moshi
Municipal) (n = 4), and ward-level (n = 55) administrators
and technical staff with general, human and/or animal
health mandates; elected ward-level councillors; and
ward-level health committee volunteers in order to cap-
ture a wide range of actors and activities in local govern-
ance and management of zoonotic disease and meat
safety. In this paper, the concept of ‘meat safety’ is used to
refer to the presence or absence of pathogens in meat
which can cause disease in humans [39]. This recognises
that the presence/absence of pathogens in meat is not in-
dependent from livestock health and its management; nor
of how meat is handled or its handlers regulated, and ac-
knowledges the social/political interfaces between state ac-
tors and private citizens. Regional and district-level actors
were selected for their key roles, while those filling posi-
tions of interest in each of five randomly selected wards
from Moshi Rural District and five from Moshi Munici-
pality, were also interviewed (see Table 1). This emphasis
on a wide range of respondents was informed by the One
Health framework which recognises the connections be-
tween animal, human and environmental health [40]. In
most cases, each relevant position was occupied by one
individual in each respective ward.2 In some instances, the
position was either not occupied or the position-holder
declined to be interviewed. In another, one person
Table 1 Interviewees’ role, location and gender
Respondent roles Moshi rural district
(rural, peri-urban)
Moshi municipality
(urban)
Regional
Frontline technical staff Livestock Field Officers (LFOs/LEOs) 5 (M = 4, F = 1) 5 (M = 3, F = 2) -
Public Health Officers (HOs) 4a (M = 1, F = 3) 5b (M = 1, F = 4) -
Health & Environment Committee volunteers 5 (M = 2, F = 3) 5 (M = 2, F = 3) -
Clinic-based human medical workers 5 (M = 1, F = 4) 4a (M = 2, F = 2) -
Subtotal 19 (M = 8, F = 11) 19 (M = 8, F = 11) -
Administrative & elected officials Ward Executive Officers 5 (M = 4, F = 1) 5b (M = 3, F = 2) -
Elected ward-level officials 5 (M = 5) 3a (M = 3) -
High-ranking municipal official - 1 (M = 1) -
District-level veterinary operatives - 3 (M = 3) -
Regional-level animal health operatives - - 2 (M = 2)
Subtotal 10 (M = 9, F = 1) 12 (M = 10, F = 2) 2 (M = 2)
Total respondents 61 (M = 36, F = 25)
M Male, F Female
aIndicates that one or more wards either did not have an individual in post at the time, or he/she was not available for interview
bOne respondent held the position of both Ward Executive Officer and HO for his ward
The subtotals are presented in bold
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occupied two roles of interest. This meant a total of 55
ward-level respondents were identified and interviewed. A
further six key informants were identified at regional and
district levels, bringing the total to 61. Because decisions
about whom to interview were made in relation to par-
ticular posts, gender and other social markers were not
considered in the selection process. The disproportion-
ately low number of female interviewees in livestock ex-
tension/meat inspection and managerial/leadership roles
reflects socio-cultural associations between masculinity,
livestock-rearing and red meat [41]3 and broader, widely-
observed gendered power relations and barriers to African
women’s professional advancement [42–44].
Interviews took place in situ from February 2017 to
February 2018 in Kiswahili before being translated and
transcribed into English by the author (BM). Back trans-
lation into Kiswahili was deemed unnecessary as the
interviewer (BM) was involved in transcription, transla-
tion and reviewing interpretations and meanings used in
this paper. Moreover, this research prioritises situated
knowledge produced through interactions between re-
spondents and the interviewer in relatively open-ended
dialogue rather than literal objective translation, or con-
sistent sets of meaning [45].
As this research took an inductive approach, open-
ended, semi-structured interview schedules were designed
– in consultation with a number of experts on the topic,
the interviewer, and senior Tanzanian policy makers – to
guide discussion and to elicit contextually-rich pictures of
the roles, routines, experiences, challenges, strategies, and
perceptions of respondents in relation to policy, meat
safety, animal health and zoonoses.4
Data analysis was approached inductively and con-
ducted through a grounded approach, allowing conceptual
and theoretical insights to emerge from the data rather
than from preconceived notions derived from existing lit-
erature. Interview data were first thoroughly read by the
two lead authors (TH and LW) to gain a holistic sense of
themes, patterns and relationships [46]. Open coding
techniques were used and a preliminary coding structure
developed. Then, through several cycles of reading,
rereading and coding the data using Nvivo 12 (QSR Inter-
national, Australia), the coding structure evolved, expand-
ing and transforming as increased familiarity with the data
yielded new insights, relationships, categories and abstrac-
tions [46, 47]. Through this process of ‘emergent flexibil-
ity’ [48], we noted interesting patterns pointing to what
we came to interpret as ‘diplomacy’ operating at the
‘street’ level, leading to the observations, assertions and
links to existing literature underpinning this paper.
Respondents not directly involved in meat inspection,
livestock, and environmental and public health enforce-
ment (elected politicians, general administrators and su-
pervisors, human clinical workers) discussed their roles
in relation to, or signalled the importance of LEOs and
HOs, of which we interviewed ten and nine respectively.
The centrality of these workers as frontline service pro-
viders, inspectors and law enforcers led us to focus pri-
marily on them. Working under the administrative
supervision of Ward Executive Officers, and technical
supervision of their district-level superiors, their primary
responsibilities fall into three overlapping categories.
The first set of activities, disease preventative mea-
sures, involves LEOs dispensing animal husbandry ad-
vice to livestock keepers, occasional treatment of
livestock, and carrying out annual livestock vaccination
campaigns against diseases of importance, as determined
by district authorities, usually anthrax and rabies. LEOs
mentioned they carried out routine visits to livestock
keepers on a daily basis, suggesting at times that these
visits were both solicited and routine. Appropriately-
qualified LEOs are allowed, but not officially required, to
provide vaccines and other drugs, and many use their
own money to purchase them from private shops to
then sell to livestock keepers [25, 49]. Although histor-
ical government subsidization of animal drugs ceased in
the 1990s in favour of a private market system, occasion-
ally vaccines are free or subsidized, usually in response
to outbreaks or through donor-funded initiatives [50].
The second set of activities involves the management
of serious animal or related human disease, whether a
singular occurrence, or outbreak. For serious diseases,
such as anthrax, this may include emergency vaccin-
ation, treatment of humans and animals, quarantine, and
safe disposal or condemnation of infected meat, car-
casses or animals [51]. Given there is no formal surveil-
lance of foodborne disease in Tanzania however [52],
many less spectacular disease incidents remain un-
detected, un-investigated and unreported.
The third set of activities involves monitoring and in-
spection of meat, and the establishments it passes through
in order to protect consumers and prevent zoonotic dis-
ease transmission. Many LEOs perform meat inspection
(ante- and post-mortem) at small slaughter slabs – often
simple cement platforms of three or four square meters,
usually owned by individual butchers and often adjacent
to their butcheries (see Fig. 1) – or at larger more centra-
lised publicly- or privately-owned slaughterhouses.5 In-
spection involves visual assessment, palpation, and muscle
and organ incision with additional detailed carcass exam-
ination if organ lesions are detected, and subsequent con-
demnation of meat/organs unfit for consumption [53, 54].
LEOs should also prevent and stop sales of unin-
spected meat, inspected but condemned meat and un-
authorised livestock slaughter. They mentioned making
follow-up visits, often reported as random or ad-hoc, to
butcheries to ensure meat for sale has been inspected
and marked safe with a government stamp, and that
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workers and butchery facilities meet required standards,
although the implied frequency with which they carried
out such visits varied from ‘occasionally’ to daily and
duration of these visits was not commented on. Stan-
dards which respondents emphasised included that
workers wear uniforms and have clean bills of health
and that butcheries are outfitted with tiled walls, plastic
chopping boards, electric or manual meat saws, running
water and screens6 to protect meat from flies and contami-
nants. HOs also inspect butcheries and eateries for health
and hygiene standards, checking that premises are generally
clean and that staff have current medical certificates. While
no respondents mentioned enforcing standards relating to
slaughter process, government documents advocate particu-
lar methods, such as regular sterilization of knives, and
careful isolation of gut contents [53]. When encountering
non-compliance – unstamped meat for sale, or butcheries
without handwashing facilities for instance – LEOs and
HOs are responsible for meting out sanctions such as fines,
condemning meat or closing offending businesses.
Results
Challenges for animal health and meat safety
Tanzania has committed to a One Health agenda to ac-
knowledge and act upon linkages between animal, human,
and environmental health, and this includes recognition of
foodborne and meat-borne disease [24, 55, 56]. This has
resulted in greater support and collaboration for inte-
grated research, including on the biosocial dimensions of
zoonoses [40] but it is as yet unclear how this has affected
frontline actors’ daily activities to promote livestock health
and prevent foodborne illness. The veterinary sector in
Tanzania, as in other sub-Saharan countries, lacks capacity
for service provision and enforcement, and struggles with
inadequate investment [20, 38, 49]. Only 20% of Tanzania’s
rural livestock keepers utilise extension services [18] and
only 6% of the country’s approximately 12 thousand regis-
tered villages have village-level LEOs. These low numbers
result, in part, from recruitment cuts beginning in the
mid-1990s, and in part, from bureaucratic reforms to pri-
vatise veterinary services in spite of livestock keepers’ in-
ability to pay for them and poor rural infrastructure [49,
50]. Consequentially, state LEOs are often the only live-
stock professionals to which communities – and particu-
larly rural ones – have access, although there may be
other informal actors such as community animal health
workers [25, 57, 58].
LEOs, and particularly those assigned to rural wards,
are often charged with covering large geographical areas,
and many lack official, or adequate transportation [25].
This, along with few colleagues with whom to share re-
sponsibility, was the most frequently cited challenge
from both urban and rural respondents in this study. It
was seen as hindering LEOs from assisting livestock
keepers, preventing zoonoses, and addressing meat
safety risks. The Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries ad-
vocates a ratio of one LEO per village and recognises
transport as a key ‘priority investment area’ for improv-
ing LEOs’ capacity [26, pers. comm. 7/11/2018]. One re-
gional informant said the government tried to ensure all
ward-level LEOs were issued motorbikes, although at
the time of our interviews, only four of ten LEO respon-
dents had them. The rest relied on their own motor-
bikes, hired transport, or walked. Access to a motorbike
did not ensure effective performance however. Rural
LEOs were often solely (or with only few colleagues) re-
sponsible for very large territories with poor roads that
worsened during rainy seasons. Timeliness for slaughter
inspection was a concern, and it was impossible to al-
ways be on site before slaughter occurred. Many LEOs
had several distant sites to visit, most of which began
operating before daybreak to ensure ‘warm’ meat was
available for customers at the start of each day.
Shortage of material resources was another common
concern for LEOs. In relation to inspection, uniforms
and government ID cards were seen to provide LEOs
and HOs with important symbolic authority. LEOs’ lack
of uniforms was perceived as undercutting their ability
to demand, as legislated, that butchers wear them - espe-
cially in urban areas. As one LEO put it, how could he
insist on butchers wearing uniforms when he himself did
not? Insufficient diagnostic tools also compromised
LEOs’ field work. They perceived that when serious and/
or unknown cases of animal disease were encountered,
samples had to be sent for diagnosis to the district clinic
in Moshi where they believed testing capacity was lim-
ited to anthrax or, more often, to the Veterinary Investi-
gation Centre (VIC) in Arusha. This takes time and can
lead to mistrust or at least, the danger that disease will
spread in the meantime. And while trained in meat
Fig. 1 - Slaughter slab in a rural ward (photograph by HAZEL
Consortium member)
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inspection techniques which make use of sight, smell,
palpation, and incision (one claimed to ‘taste’ raw meat
to detect medicine), they lacked technical equipment to
support their inspections [53]. This meant that they
could not immediately identify many zoonotic enteric
pathogens, such as Salmonella, which do not manifest
as illness in live animals or cause overt visual symptoms
in meat, and yet may have significant negative conse-
quences for human health. Indeed, such pathogens were
not mentioned by LEOs or others, suggesting that they
were not perceived to be significant threats. This is a
well-recognised limitation of visual post-mortem meat
inspection which, in many other contexts, has resulted
in the emphasis and adoption of risk-based approaches.
Lack of clarity over, and farmers’ reluctance to pay for
services historically provided freely by the government,
represents another substantial challenge. While LEOs’
remit does not explicitly mandate (nor prohibit) the sale
of drugs, treatment and other services, this practice was
universally reported among our LEO respondents. They
rationalised their sale of drugs and vaccines – which
they purchased wholesale from private animal drug
shops – as saving farmers from having to travel to town
and paying cost prices, often for much larger doses than
required for their animals. LEOs’ fees for drugs were me-
diated by prices in the private drug market, which varied
geographically and over time, and by the distance and
travel necessary to reach farmers. They claimed not to
profit from these sales. However, many LEOs and other
frontline actors perceived that farmers believed they
were being exploited, and one LEO referred to ‘other
LEOs’ who profit unfairly from drug sales. Variance in
LEOs’ fees – based partly on costs and partly on LEOs’
assessments of what different clients could afford [25] –
further exacerbated tension, particularly in relation to
mandatory (yet not always free) vaccination campaigns.
That some free vaccines were, although very rarely, pro-
vided by district-level authorities or donor projects in re-
sponse to localised outbreaks of anthrax or rabies,
created further confusion and spurred resistance. As one
LEO explained:
[…] last time we had rabies vaccines, we were asked to
cover only villages bordering Kilimanjaro National
Park [as these were considered most at risk]. We did
as required, the rest paid. They complained but we
showed them the letter from the District Council but
they couldn’t understand. You know what that meant
- others refused to vaccinate. (Rural LEO, F)
Compounding many challenges highlighted above are
LEOs’ and other frontline actors’ low pay. In addition to
meagre baseline salaries, three LEOs with meat inspec-
tion duties mentioned they were entitled to extra pay, as
their responsibilities required starting work as early as 3
am, and overtime on weekends and holidays when more
animals are slaughtered. They had not received this extra
pay for years, and consequently expressed demotivation
and frustration. While there is evidence of Tanzanian
frontline actors supplementing their low salaries through
abuse of the system [59], no respondents admitted to
such activities, although three non-LEO interviewees
suspected bribery or ‘collusion’ occurring occasionally
between meat inspectors and butchers and two LEOs
mentioned refusing bribes.
Despite the many challenges and obvious frustrations,
many LEOs and HOs remained motivated by recogni-
tion of the seriousness and necessity of their work in
preventing disease and supporting livelihoods. In seeking
to implement policy in a context characterised by trans-
port and other material resource deficits, challenges re-
lated to drug and vaccination provision, low morale and
inadequate pay, these frontline actors employ a range of
strategies and skills to ensure meat safety.
Strategies and skills for frontline action
Frontline actors’ main strategies to do their work included:
using symbols of authority strategically; leveraging networks
and teamwork; adapting to local contexts; and building local
expertise. Each of these is discussed in turn below.
Symbols of authority: policy and officialdom
When asked about relevant legislation, most ward-level
respondents made reference to ‘directives’ or local
bylaws – which they explained provided them with guid-
ance, legitimacy, and protection – rather than to
national-level legislation. This corroborates previous
government research that found little awareness among
LEOs regarding specific laws such as the Animal Disease
or Public Health Acts. Respondents indicated that ‘direc-
tives’ originated from ‘above’ – from authorities at min-
istry, regional or district level. In some cases, they may
have been referring to regulations drawn up by minis-
tries as directed in national Acts, while in others, they
seemed to refer to ad-hoc measures or bylaws, the latter
being developed at district, ward and village level [60].
Thus, lack of awareness around national laws – copies
of which were not readily available to most – did not ne-
cessarily mean respondents were wholly unaware of their
responsibilities and several spoke of learning about and
discussing directives and bylaws at district or ward-level
meetings, or receiving letters about them.
Enforcement situations – such as condemning and
destroying unstamped meat, or threatening to close
butcheries or eateries for failing to meet hygiene stan-
dards – were often tense, contested and difficult. It was
therefore important for frontline actors to assert their
authority. HOs, LEOs and committee volunteers would,
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as shown below, cite from or, if they had them, physic-
ally show livestock keepers and meat handlers relevant
provisions in print.
Before we destroy unsafe meat or food we have to read
the sections of the bylaw covering food censure and
destruction to the owner. (Rural HO, F)
Whenever we go to the site for inspection we normally
take [the legislation] [ … ], we don’t scare business
people. Before we take any action we educate and
show them the section in the regulations [ … ]. You
know many regulations are in English but we translate
and explain some sections to the butchers and farmers.
(Urban LEO, M)
This strategy of appealing to officialdom – through
taking along, reading aloud and explaining legislation –
was usually referenced in relation to inspection of sites
where meat was sold. It was seen, as indicated in the
quote above, as embodying the necessary diplomacy and
respect not to ‘scare’ business people while still encour-
aging their compliance. One LEO had requested an add-
itional, official letter from the district council to
reinforce his authority:
We requested the district personnel to write the letter
on our behalf to put more weight on it, as they respect
and follow directives from higher levels more than
from the ward. (Rural LEO, M)
Resistance was sometimes met with threats of legal ac-
tion, although few concrete examples were offered, in
part perhaps, because the courts were not seen as very
effective [61]. A more common strategy in such ‘compli-
cated cases’ was to request additional support from dis-
trict or municipal-level authorities.
They sometimes call us in to deal with someone who is
not complying with the regulations, we go as a team to
arrest the situation and make them comply. (Urban
District Livestock Officer, M)
If they don’t respond and cooperate with me, recalling
the previous incidents, then I will call for assistance
from the municipal level. (Urban HO, F)
While such appeals to ‘officialdom’ were usually made
in the context of regulatory duties, some LEOs sought to
similarly smooth tensions with farmers regarding treat-
ment fees. They innovated mechanisms to ‘officialise’
service and drug fee charges. For one rural LEO, this
took the form of letters from district authorities, and a
system of official receipts:
We asked the district council to write an official letter
explaining to farmers they should pay for the services.
The document will enable us to work smoothly with
farmers. If an animal is suffering from say
anaplasmosis, I will write a list of items to buy [ … ]
and ask him or her to buy them from any veterinary
shop. It’s always difficult for them to buy them. Then
we negotiate the treatment price. Now we use special
receipts from the district council. (Rural LEO, F)
The need to regulate LEOs’ fee structures has also
been recognised by government research as necessary
to ‘make the system of livestock services more effect-
ive’ [25]. In the meantime, frontline actors make
frequent appeals to ‘officialdom’ to legitimise their
own authority and rely heavily on collaborative
relationships.
Teamwork and leveraging networks
As illustrated above, meat condemnation can be diffi-
cult and contested as it involves destruction of prop-
erty and income loss. Condemnation can happen at
households where animals have died or been infor-
mally slaughtered; at slaughter sites (slabs or slaugh-
terhouses); and at sites of meat sale. Although LEOs
were sometimes invited by households or butchers to
assess whether animals or carcasses were safe for
consumption (in such instances, people were generally
grateful, even if this resulted in condemnation), LEOs
and HOs did at times discover or receive tip-offs
from community members about suspicious animal
deaths, slaughter, or meat sale. In such situations, and
especially those in which human health was perceived
to be clearly and/or immediately at risk, inspectors
felt they had to act – but they often faced resistance
or even, at times, personal danger. As such, frontline
actors often drew on their professional networks to
respond collectively:
I had to form a small team of four, including the HO
and two other meat inspectors from nearby wards. We
arrived at the butchery, we didn’t ask many questions,
we just condemned the meat. (Urban LEO, F)
The above example involved a female LEO who subse-
quently worried the male butcher might ‘hire people to
harm’ her. Another rural female LEO’s diagnosis of an-
thrax was initially met with disbelief. ‘Luckily’, she
explained, a retired male LEO and other staff had ac-
companied her, otherwise ‘they would have harmed me
or refused to bury [the carcass]’. She recounted another
incident of condemnation when a male livestock owner
threatened her with a knife. She called a senior male col-
league for backup. Such fears were not only experienced
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by female inspectors. One rural, experienced, male LEO
worried about being poisoned, while another expressed
safety concerns when commuting in the dark. Further-
more, during informal follow-up conversations between
the author (TH) and two female officers (one LEO and
one HO), these experiences were not perceived as particu-
lar to their gender. Such examples, nevertheless, demon-
strate the importance of both men and women officers
being able to draw upon a team for support when under-
taking contentious acts of enforcement.
Frontline actors have, as indicated in the following
quotes, become skilled at sensing when to call-in their
colleagues:
If I’m alone, it depends on the understanding of the
butcher. If he accepts the truth we condemn it without
problems but if he doesn’t, I call for assistance from
other HOs from the municipal level and neighbouring
wards to participate in the condemnation process.
(Urban HO, F)
If I see an indication that the owner might bring
problems later, I invite the District Vet Officer, HO
and Solicitor, and fill in condemnation forms as
required by law. (Urban LEO, M)
Professional networks were not only important for dif-
ficult enforcement situations. Two LEOs reported using
mobile phone apps to participate in informal LEO net-
works, seeking advice in the absence of regular training.
Photographing a carcass and getting confirmation of a
diagnosis bolsters LEOs’ confidence and can project au-
thority while also informally sharing information about
disease patterns:
We have established an LEO group on smart phones.
If one has a problem or needs clarification, we take
photos and circulate them. (Rural LEO, M)
This network is very important as it provides
opportunities to communicate to areas where [sick]
animals are coming from [and tell them] to take
control measures. (Rural LEO, M)
Many frontline actors also drew upon local community
networks and power structures for practical and political
support. Announcements about vaccination campaigns
or disease outbreaks were frequently made through reli-
gious organisations, savings and micro-finance groups,
farmers groups, at markets and even funerals. LEOs and
HOs – especially those in rural settings – also relied on
local elected leaders at sub-village and street (urban)
level to disseminate information, and to accompany
them during vaccination campaigns or community
hygiene inspections.7 In so doing, they relied on elected
leaders’ good relationships with community members to
encourage compliance.
I will seek support from the chairpersons of the
sub-villages. They are very powerful. People listen to
them as they are elected by community members.
(Rural HO, F)
We usually move around with village and sub-village
leaders during official vaccination. They are very
important as they participate in sensitization and
people trust them. (Rural LEO, M)
As indicated in these quotes, trust was central to
accomplishing any work requiring the cooperation of
residents, and local leaders were seen to be ‘very close to
their village members’. They were capable of securing
buy-in and participation beyond what officers could
achieve given their inability to spend much time getting
to know and delivering services in communities.
Adapting to local contexts
As frontline actors, LEOs and HOs were highly cognizant
of the social and economic context in which they worked.
They recognised that poverty affected people’s ability to pay
for services, upgrade their premises, and comply with pol-
icy. Indeed, many respondents identified inability to afford
services, drugs or upgrades as drivers of disease, and thus
were sensitive to, and sought to accommodate, these local
constraints. One rural LEO, quoted below, allowed poor
livestock keepers to defer vaccination payments despite
knowing reimbursement was unlikely. He and others also
shared information about free vaccinations strategically:
We don’t announce free vaccines. We announce the
campaign, and then during the process and in
collaboration with sub-village leaders, we identify
weak families unable to pay and give them free
vaccinations. (Rural LEO, M)
Sensitivity to local conditions also helped LEOs and
others recognise the difficulty of implementing certain
regulatory recommendations – for instance that
butchers have electric meat saws and deep freezers –
leading them to overlook these when electricity was
unavailable, unreliable, or unaffordable. Most focused in-
stead on more context-appropriate regulations such as
easily-cleanable tiled walls, glass windows, hand-washing
facilities (running water hook-ups, or spigot-buckets)
and plastic chopping boards, although the appropriate-
ness of the latter was questioned by some.
LEOs’ and HOs’ sensitivity to poverty made them
‘careful’ and diplomatic in monitoring butcheries and
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meat handlers. One way of managing their relationships
with butchers – which they were wary of damaging –
was to selectively limit enforcement:
Meat inspection is a sensitive job. I must be careful,
otherwise I may damage good relationships with the
butchers. After meat inspection, the rest of the work is
done by the HO and other staff. I don’t want to follow
business people that much, although I have to make
sure the meat is safe to eat. (Urban LEO, M)
This LEO emphasised making sure meat was inspected,
choosing to leave ‘the rest of the work’ – such as ensuring
hygiene and infrastructural compliance – to others. Dur-
ing meat inspection at slaughter, several LEOs reported
trying to minimise butchers’ losses:
We feel very bad every time we discard animal livers.
It’s a loss to butchers, but what can we do, we want
consumers to eat safe meat. We may decide to trim
the liver and remove affected areas to minimise loss.
(Rural LEO, M)
When we find an animal with a disease that cannot
affect other animals like dogs […], we call [the dog
owners]. The owner of the cow would negotiate the
price […] and can at least recover part of the loss
incurred. (Urban LEO, M)
LEOs used a number of strategies that included: ratio-
nalising non-enforcement of certain regulations, leaving
work to HOs, and/or negotiating with butchers and
farmers to upgrade their facilities and change their
behaviour. While inspectors may have had personal ‘red
lines’ in terms of minimum standards, HOs and LEOs
alike emphasised a combination of flexibility and
insistence:
We explained to them the law requires all butcheries
to meet hygiene standards. We had a tough time at
first, but we sensitized them to the benefits and need
for standards. We agreed on a deadline and all had
to obey. I reminded them that if they didn’t make
changes before the deadline we would not provide
slaughtering services. (Rural LEO, M)
We have a lot to do, educating them to accept changes
as a way of improving their business and safeguarding
the health of their customers. We explain the possible
consequences if slabs remains dirty allowing dogs and
other animals scavenging on them. […] We educate
them first, give them time to adopt the directed
changes, if they don’t comply we finally use force.
(Rural HO, M)
LEOs and HOs understood the financial impact up-
grades, business closures and fines could have, and that
business people often claimed to be, or were unaware of
regulations. Thus, they issued a series of reminders, warn-
ings and deadlines before taking punitive action. One LEO
with over two decades’ experience repeatedly emphasised
the importance of what he called the ‘extension approach,’
the core of which, he explained, is communicating sensi-
tively and diplomatically with butchers and meat handlers
to gain their trust, educate them and encourage their
compliance. This combination of flexibility, patience and
skilful communication reflects recognition of both local
socio-economic realities and social-cultural understand-
ings of respectful interpersonal interaction in both urban
and rural settings. For these reasons, LEOs and HOs did
not simply mete out fines for non-compliance. Instead
they explained ‘the importance of implementing the law
and the consequences of not complying’ (urban committee
volunteer, F), confiscated unsafe meat, issued cautions and
waited to see if improvements were implemented. When
fines could no longer be delayed, frontline actors found
ways to lessen the impact for those who could not afford
to pay:
This ward is one of the poorest in the Municipal
Council. We understand nobody can pay that amount
of money at once. They do it by instalment, or we may
even forgive them. (Urban HO, F)
In extreme cases of non-compliance, frontline actors
did at times close businesses, but still they sought to
limit associated financial burdens:
After I’m satisfied with the work done, I allow them to
continue business again. We don’t ask them to pay a
fine, because that would be double punishment. (Rural
committee volunteer, F)
What is clear in the above examples is frontline actors’
use of discretion and diplomacy to carry out their duties
in ways sensitive to local economic realities, social
norms and expectations. This allows them to negotiate
behaviour change in ways that preserve, in as far as pos-
sible given the nature of their work, relationships of
trust with butchers and others.
Building local expertise and capacity
Our respondents emphasised the importance of educa-
tion and awareness-raising about animal health, meat
safety, and human disease. This ranged from advising
consumers about safe meat consumption, to teaching
farmers and butchers to recognise signs of animal illness
and unsafe meat and explaining why certain protocols
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and standards existed. Such instruction happens through
campaigns, meetings, training, media, and religious for-
ums, and involve both independent and collaborative ef-
forts. Clinical personnel for instance, described disease
prevention efforts through in-clinic training.
Health education is done every day at the dispensary.
It’s like prayers, we have fixed timetables showing
that today we have health education on nutrition,
on malaria, etc. If there is an outbreak of animal
disease, we also include it in the sessions.
(Urban nurse, F)
Community volunteers serving on ward and village or
street-level health and environment committees, often in
collaboration with HOs, taught local residents to protect
themselves and others by buying only inspected meat,
and encouraged its thorough cooking.
[At public gatherings] we tell them not to eat
un-inspected meat and the government stamp on the
meat means inspection was done and it is safe to eat.
(Rural committee volunteer, F)
I talk a lot with mama lishe [food sellers] on proper
ways of food preparation […] they have to make sure
that food is cooked for a long-time in a clean
environment. (Urban HO, F)
Certain frontline actors recognised the importance of
‘meeting’ people where they are. They therefore stressed
their efforts, despite resource constraints, to visit far-
flung corners of a ward, recognising they might, through
education rather than timely inspection, prevent deaths
from consuming infected meat. They also recognised
that many people did not have capacity or inclination to
attend public functions or meetings. In the words of one
rural LEO referring to past government efforts to con-
vene farmer groups for training purposes:
They have other issues to deal with, they cannot waste
time listening to facilitators for several hours without
getting anything tangible at the end of the day.
‘What shall we eat this evening, your words? We have
families we need to feed, we cannot waste our time
listening to you.’ (Rural LEO, M)
LEOs therefore also built training into their individual
household visits.
We educate family members every time we visit for
animal treatment. We tell them the symptoms of
animal diseases, how they are transmitted and how to
control them. (Rural LEO, M)
Indeed, LEOs’ mandated duties to support animal-based
livelihoods include such instruction. However, they broad-
ened the remit of their prescribed educational duties to in-
clude coaching butchers to identify unsafe meat and
understand why particular standards were necessary.
We educate them on the consequences of butcheries
without required infrastructure. [We explain that]
meat which comes in contact with flies may harm
their consumers. We demonstrate the difference
between a wall covered with tiles and one not. If the
blood splashes on a wall without tiles, how would they
clean it? (Urban LEO, F)
This strategy – of training butchers so they might self-
regulate – helped LEOs and others address their own lim-
ited capacity to serve and inspect all places punctually.
It may happen I am late to the slaughter site, I allow
them to continue selling meat if no unusual symptoms
have been seen on the animal carcass. I’m glad no one
has ever betrayed my trust. They know how to examine
the meat, I always show them …. (Rural LEO, M)
One LEO also linked butchers’ understandings of meat
safety to the mitigation of conflict should he have to
condemn meat:
So we have to educate [butchers] why the meat must
be thrown away. Some understand. There must be
obvious reasons and fortunately they can see this with
their own eyes. So we do a lot of counselling and they
sometimes do their own observation before I arrive.
They know beforehand that today there will be no
lungs or kidneys or heart etc. When I arrive they
keep quiet to hear the final decision from me.
(Rural LEO, M)
Education was thus, not only a way of ‘sensitising’
community members to ‘the benefits of complying with
the laws and regulations on health issues’ (urban HO,
M) and of raising general consciousness about human
and animal health, it was also about being fair in a
resource-strapped context. As shown above, punitive ac-
tion for non-compliance was often treated as a last re-
sort, meted out only after considerable effort to inform
people of rules, standards and associated rationales.
Discussion
The concept ‘street-level diplomacy’ makes visible and
better theorises the skills which enable frontline actors
to implement policy, despite limited material resources,
and institutional and cultural barriers [37]. It brings the
bureaucratic dimensions of rules, procedures, and
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decision-making together with more diplomatic aspects
of negotiation, communication and persuasion and
draws attention to frontline actors’ ‘soft’ power to create
and leverage networks, and to engage, build trust and
persuade individuals to comply with policy. In contrast
to much previous work which emphasises street-level
bureaucrats’ undermining power, Gale and colleagues
call attention to the power of frontline actors’ discretion-
ary use of diplomacy to work towards policy goals
through seemingly unorthodox routes.
The data described above reinforces the notion that
frontline actors do not always implement regulations
and policy as envisioned by high-level policy makers.
Rather, exercising discretion and autonomy in their day-
to-day activities, they adapt to contexts in which they
work, innovating on legislative prescriptions, leveraging
informal strategies, and choosing not to enforce at times.
Literature on street-level bureaucrats often frames such
behaviour as necessary (particularly in the light of scarce
resources), yet resulting in ‘selective implementation’ or
problematic divergence from high-level policy aims [29,
30] and, at times, this may indeed be the case. Like Gale
and colleagues [37] however, this paper offers an alterna-
tive perspective highlighting how frontline actors use
their discretion and a range of diplomatic skills and
strategies to approximate higher policy goals. Indeed, in
low-resource contexts, such skills and strategies have
been described by Funder and Marani as ‘a prerequisite
of the African state’. They note that environmental offi-
cers in Kenya occupy ‘an ambiguous position in which
they are expected to implement lofty laws and policies
with limited means and in a complex local reality’ and
that their ability to navigate this creatively was essential
to ‘keep this old truck on the road’ [62].
To accomplish this in the Tanzanian context, the
frontline actors we interviewed used a blend of formal
and informal strategies and soft and hard power to tailor
their mandates to complex realities and individual en-
counters. This allowed them to function creatively des-
pite constraints, and more specifically, to build trust
with communities they worked in, boost their own cap-
acity and legitimacy, and develop local residents’ ability
to self-regulate.
Building and maintaining trust
Trust, while recognised in literature on street-level bu-
reaucrats [30], is an underappreciated dimension in
local-level regulatory and service provision activities
[63]. If people mistrust frontline actors, they are likely to
be suspicious of the behaviours and practices frontline
actors would like them to adopt, or even of the services
they provide [38]. Mugambi and colleagues found in
Kenya for instance, that pastoralists remained suspicious
of biomedicine and LEOs’ motives due to infrequent
encounters and negative experiences [64]. Similar histor-
ies of distrust taint Tanzanian extension workers [65,
66]. While LEOs, HOs and others in our study did not
explicitly claim they worked to build trust among people
to approximate policy goals, they nevertheless articu-
lated strategies that do this.
Cognizant that people were not necessarily aware of
regulations, and that many were poor, frontline actors
stressed the importance of carefully explaining and
counselling to butchers exactly what the rules and stan-
dards were, and why they should be followed, or in the
case of livestock keepers, why they should participate in
vaccination campaigns and call LEOs in the event of ani-
mal death or illness. Non-compliance, especially if inter-
preted to result from a lack of awareness or inability to
afford necessary changes, was met with patience and
flexibility and ‘double punishment’ – fines on top of
business closure or meat condemnation –avoided. These
strategies reflect frontline actors’ sensitivity to local eco-
nomic capacity and recognition of the importance of
fairness. They knew, not only that it was unrealistic to
expect immediate investments and compliance, but that
they also needed to build and maintain positive relation-
ships: ‘I understand we have to enforce laws, but some-
times you have to act with caution to avoid conflicts and
misunderstandings’ (urban HO, F). In this way, choosing
at times not to enforce was a strategy in and of itself.
This was best illustrated by LEOs who inspected meat
but overlooked hygiene issues so as not to create unrea-
sonable difficulties for businesses or, as one phrased it,
to not ‘follow business people that much’ (urban LEO,
M). In this way, they could avoid the risk of being seen
as too demanding, preserve space for positive relations,
and thus potentially make future cooperation more
likely. Dickinson and Sullivan [67] see policy implemen-
ters’ attempts to engage with local people’s values as a
form of cultural performance which, through ‘contextu-
alized interaction’, builds trust. They argue that such be-
haviours enhance policy efficacy and implementation
because, in engaging with local social norms, frontline
actors are also affirming values, constituting meaning
and building social efficacy.
Frontline actors’ authority and trustworthiness was
also boosted by working collaboratively with elected
leaders, especially during animal vaccination campaigns
and hygiene inspections, and through engagement with
community institutions, like churches and mosques, to
announce campaigns or disease outbreaks. Such collab-
oration aligned disease control and meat safety with
locally-recognised and respected networks which people
freely associated with, and with locally elected leader-
ship. While this may not necessarily guarantee wide-
spread awareness or ensure vaccination coverage [38], it
illustrates LEOs’ and HOs’ recognition of the importance
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of networks of trust for policy implementation. Carey et
al. argue, that trust is ‘critical to implementation’ in
complex, dynamic and highly-relational contemporary
contexts [28]. It enhances cooperation, reduces transac-
tion costs, increases predictability and reduces oppor-
tunistic behaviour [63]. In keeping with this, LEOs’, HOs’
and other’s accounts show they have nurtured trust to
enhance regulation and implementation of meat safety
in northern Tanzania.
Boosting frontline actors’ regulatory capacity
Despite frontline actors’ patience, flexibility and diplo-
macy, there were times they felt they had to act, such as
when human health was immediately at risk. This in-
cluded having to condemn unsafe or uninspected meat,
or dealing with individuals’ or businesses’ repeated or
gross non-compliance. When such instances occurred,
they relied on formality – on professional relationships,
hierarchy, and policy documents – to boost their cap-
acity for regulation and enforcement. These can be seen
as symbols which enhance the efficacy of the regulatory
process [28]. Although meat and animal condemnation
technically required the presence of multiple frontline
actors and, in some instances, an official laboratory
diagnosis, LEOs and HOs described scenarios in which
they, as individuals, were sufficiently confident to con-
demn and destroy meat.8 In situations of active resist-
ance, LEOs and others called upon colleagues, including
district-level superiors, to back them up. This served to
allocate responsibility for punitive measures – which did
on occasion cause conflict and fear – higher up in gov-
ernment or across a team. In so doing, these frontline
actors demonstrated their ability to ‘draw different policy
strands together, to reconcile competing priorities’, and
‘to relinquish control while managing risk’ [28] while
also pronouncing defined policy goals.
Indeed, contrary to much literature on street-level bu-
reaucrats, which sees frontline actors as ‘shirking or
sabotaging’ official responsibilities [30], these LEOs and
HOs regarded formal policy positively [36]. They saw it
not only as providing clear and necessary guidelines to
safeguard public health, but as bestowing on them legit-
imacy and authority to act, and granting them legal pro-
tection. Some frontline actors had copies of policy texts
or special letters from district authorities which they car-
ried and read aloud ‘to put more weight’ on what they
asked of people. This tactic was used in delicate situa-
tions of immediate concern (such as confiscating meat),
and as part of a range of diplomatic strategies to per-
suade people to engage in long-term infrastructural, pro-
cedural or behavioural change. But regulation and
authority were not, on their own, enough. As demon-
strated above, LEOs and HOs emphasised the need to
explain regulations carefully to ensure people recognised
they were not being treated unfairly, and that there was
good reasoning behind these stipulations.
Promoting self-regulation
Education and advice is central to extension work and is
aimed at empowering farmers and livestock keepers to
optimise their livelihoods, yet frontline actors also saw
this as a means of redistributing responsibility, and
hedging risk. Constrained by material and institutional
challenges, frontline actors were under-resourced and
unable to be everywhere they needed to be. They wor-
ried that disease might erupt with disastrous health con-
sequences, and that they would be blamed for this. A
central theme of Lipsky’s theory on street-level bureau-
crats is that these actors seek maximum information
asymmetry between themselves, and the citizens they
work with to prevent their decisions being questioned
[30, 31]. In Tanzania, however, LEOs and HOs pursued
a different strategy. LEOs with meat inspection duties
emphasized their training of farmers and butchers to
recognise visible signs of disease not merely to fulfil
their duties as extension workers, but to maximise meat
safety in their inevitable absences, especially in rural
areas. Because they were incapable of overseeing all
butchers’ activities, and yet were concerned that all meat
was safe, some rural LEOs developed informal agree-
ments with butchers. They spent time teaching butchers
to identify visibly unsafe meat with the understanding
that when they were late or absent, as they inevitably
would be at times, the butchers would be responsible
and not to sell it.
During rainy season, all roads are impassable […]
It is not easy to visit […] some of the slaughter sites.
That is why I decided to train meat attendants and
butchers in basic knowledge in identifying infectious
animal disease and to inform me immediately.
(Rural LEO, M)
In proposing the concept of ‘street-level diplomacy’,
Gale and colleagues argue that ‘diplomatic activity does
not seek to enforce or coerce, but to facilitate through
assisting partners to take responsibility for their own
changes’ [37]. By rejecting the language of coercion and
enforcement and by adopting the more cooperative
language of ‘training’, ‘assisting’, and ‘informing’, the em-
phasis shifts from LEOs’ punitive and patronising impos-
ition of policy to a relationship that involves coaching
for empowerment, capacity building among food safety
actors and space for collaboration [68, 69]. For frontline
actors working for animal health and meat safety in
resource-constrained contexts, this also helps generate
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the trust and buy-in needed when, as health threats
emerge, sensitive, decisive, and unpopular decisions have
to be taken – while easing some of the LEOs’ burden of
responsibility for disease prevention.
Funder and Marani, who identified similar frontline
actor-civil society relationships in the management of
Kenya’s sensitive ecosystems, argued that ‘the risk of “shar-
ing” this authority’ was ‘far outweighed by the legitimacy’
it provided [62]. By putting so much emphasis on educa-
tion, and communicating trust that butchers and farmers
would do the right thing in policy implementers’ absence,
LEOs and HOs still face the possibility that people will
not comply. Yet, by meeting this risk – which is ultimately
impossible to avoid – with an inclusive, diplomatic ap-
proach, they attempt to minimise the potential for disease
and illness. As Mackintosh and Tibandebage argue in rela-
tion to Tanzania’s drug inspectors, ‘Effective regulatory
intervention is only possible in Tanzania if the resource
constraint on inspection and enforcement can largely be
side-stepped’ [61]. An approach which engages livestock
owners and meat sellers as regulatory partners offers a
means of achieving this for meat safety.
This study focused upon the practices and understand-
ings of the inspectors. For a more complete picture of the
inspection process, butchers’ and slaughter workers’ views
and practices should also be considered. This is an im-
portant component of red meat safety in Tanzania which
deserves academic attention. Moreover, while our results
do not suggest significant differences in the practices, un-
derstandings and experiences of male and female staff, an
important future study which further explores patriarchal
dimensions of this work more clearly is merited. These
limitations do not detract from this study’s valuable in-
sights into how Tanzania’s frontline actors use street-level
diplomacy in their attempts to ensure meat safety.
Conclusion
Frontline actors charged with ensuring meat safety in
northern Tanzania face a tension between asserting au-
thority and making demands, and building trusting rela-
tionships with those they are mandated to regulate and
serve. As shown in this paper, they navigate this tension
by drawing on a range of strategies and techniques, both
formal and informal, tailored to specific situations and
contexts. Mediated by their limited capacity and inability
to be everywhere they need to be, they stress the import-
ance of maintaining positive relationships, and do so by
deploying ‘street-level diplomacy’. This included sensitiv-
ity to local socio-economic realities, and respecting local
social norms and expectations around politeness, fair-
ness and reciprocity. They communicated carefully with
livestock owners and meat sellers, recruited the support
of influential community leaders and institutions,
explained the importance of regulations, provided grace
periods to rectify non-emergency non-compliance, and
even dismissed minor infractions, especially when they
could not fulfil their own duties. They hesitated to
strictly enforce regulations, and sought to minimize fi-
nancial loss stemming from regulatory activities. In
choosing to prioritise only some issues, and not to inter-
fere too much in butchers’ livelihoods, they preserved
positive relations.
Education and awareness were seen by these frontline ac-
tors as essential to livelihood activities and to mitigate meat
safety risks. Underpinning this was a belief that sensitising
people is key to creating change. What these frontline ac-
tors understood, however, was that a generic approach with
education at its core was not enough. Rather, livestock
owners and meat sellers had to be made to feel respected,
that they were being treated fairly, and that they were
trusted to make good decisions. This encouraged them to
learn from inspectors, and to comply with ‘reasonable’ reg-
ulations, while knowing inspectors would not impose liveli-
hood damaging expectations and standards. It also made it
easier for frontline actors to take difficult, yet occasionally
necessary actions (condemn animals or meat, or shut down
businesses) which may thus be perceived more fairly, elicit
less resistance, and encourage cooperation. Recognising
this diplomacy allows for seeing ‘non-enforcement’ in a
new light, at least in certain circumstances: as not just the
result of LEOs’ limited capacity, but as a deliberate, if un-
orthodox strategy to ensure meat safety.
By highlighting these strategies and skills, we do not in-
tend to romanticise the capabilities or intentions of front-
line actors, or even the downstream consequences of their
actions. It remains likely that some are engaged in exploit-
ative or clientalist practices, especially regarding service
provision. Moreover, these diplomatic skills and strategies
are not always sufficient for ensuring meat safety as, for
example, they cannot influence the affordability of infra-
structural improvements. We witnessed little attention to
hazards such as enteric pathogens which, given their in-
visibility, may make frontline actors more likely to pass
them over when making decisions about what standards
to enforce. Yet, in resource-constrained contexts, street-
level diplomacy may represent the ‘best possible way to
get things done under the circumstances’ [62]; and in the
absence of adequate staff, frontline actors’ flexibility
around enforcement may make them unique ‘drivers of
policy’. These seemingly inefficient, yet ‘de facto bureau-
cratic policy makers’ may contribute to more appropriate
policy implementation while simultaneously ‘promoting
local democratic control and tailoring policies to local
needs’ [61]. Thus, when considering ways to strengthen
meat safety policies in contexts such as that discussed
here, rather than seeing the partial enforcement of regula-
tions as a failure, it may be more productive to consider
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ways of working with frontline actors to enhance what
they and others can reasonably do under the constraints
they currently face.
We propose that the knowledge produced in this study
suggests (in addition to increasing resource availability)
that LEOs and other frontline actors be more included
in policy making processes, and be provided with oppor-
tunities to frankly discuss how social, economic and cul-
tural realities mediate their work, and share strategies
for maximising their capacities. This could also recog-
nise the role of training and networking opportunities
which go beyond the technical aspects of their work to
consider more explicitly the role of trust, and the deli-
cate navigation of relationships.
Endnotes
1LEOs, officially known as Livestock Field Officers
(LFOs), typically receive a diploma in animal health
or production at a specialised livestock training insti-
tute [25]. HOs are trained in the monitoring and
management of disease outbreaks and communicable
diseases
2In some cases – such as with LEOs and community vol-
unteers – there was more than one individual holding a par-
ticular position. The decision who to interview was made by
the ward-level head of the relevant department. For instance,
a lead LEO appointed a colleague, while HOs appointed par-
ticular community volunteers from their wards.
3The majority of red meat butchers in Tanzania, and
much of East Africa, are male. This stems from long-
standing cultural traditions stipulating that men are the
owners, managers and handlers of cattle.
4Two interview schedules were used, covering the
same topics but tailored to the respondents’ roles (either
technical or administrative/elected). See Additional file 1
and Additional file 2
5Slaughterhouses are enclosed or roofed buildings, and
are generally larger than slabs. They tend to operate in
more systematic and formal ways, and have more devel-
oped infrastructure (drainage systems and running
water) and equipment (such as hooks). Slaughterhouses
are not, however, as highly formal or mechanized as ab-
attoirs, such as the main facility in Arusha [53].
6Although not officially required, Regional and District
Commissioners were reported to have insisted on glass win-
dows because of the visibility offered and ease of cleaning.
7During community hygiene inspections, HOs scrutin-
ise neighbourhoods, examining sanitation and the condi-
tions animals are kept in.
8Unsafe meat or animal carcasses were buried with
lime and kerosene in serious cases. Sometimes, such as
in anthrax cases, the buried carcass was fenced off to
discourage animals from unearthing it.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Interview schedule for administrative staff, elected
officials and community health volunteers. (DOCX 20 kb)
Additional file 2: Interview schedule for frontline technical staff
(LEOs, HOs, clinical personnel) (DOCX 21 kb)
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